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Abstract 
According to firm lifecycle theory the agency costs of free cash flows are not transitory 
problems, but are a recurrent issue once firms reach a certain stage in their lifecycle. In 
particular, as firms mature their cash flows increase substantially while their investment 
opportunities decline and, to prevent retrenchment, managements need to invest in negative 
net present value projects. However, too much overinvestment leads to low firm valuation 
and potentially a hostile takeover. This paper extends firm lifecycle theory by arguing that 
to neutralize the threat of takeover, managements of maturing firms and their boards of 
directors progressively deploy antitakeover provisions which allow them to overinvest 
safely and prevent a decline in the size of their corporations. Firm lifecycle theory is also 
tested empirically. In this respect, a contribution of this paper is to develop a new empirical 
index that permits the identification of mature corporations with governance problems due 
to agency costs of free cash flows. The empirical results show that as firms mature agency 
costs of free cash flows increase, more antitakeover provisions are put into place and firms 
invest in projects with returns below their cost of capital. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Agency Theory (AT) when corporations earn substantial free cash flows, 
growth maximizing managements will tend to invest in projects that yield returns which are 
lower than the firms’ cost of capital (Jensen, 1986). Stated this way, the theory suggests 
that any firm earning significant free cash flows will likely overinvest in negative net 
present value projects. However, from the perspective of the lifecycle of the firm this 
formulation leaves out important considerations such as the expectations, held by insiders 
and outsiders alike, about the company’s future funding needs and investment 
opportunities.  
In particular, according to the lifecycle theory of the firm the agency costs of free cash 
flows are not transitory problems, but a persistent issue once firms reach a certain stage in 
their lifecycle (Mueller, 2003). Specifically, as firms mature their cash flows increase 
substantially while their investment opportunities decline, and to prevent retrenchment, 
growth maximizing managements find it necessary to invest in negative net present value 
projects. However, too much overinvestment leads to low firm valuation and potentially a 
hostile takeover. It is this threat of takeover that limits the amount of overinvestment 
undertaken by the management of the firm. On the other hand, firm lifecycle theory 
suggests that young firms will not overinvest even if it earns free cash flows at a particular 
point in time. This is because fast growing young firms usually depend on outside sources 
to finance their long term growth. If growth maximizing managements of young firms 
expect that the free cash flows will be a temporary phenomenon they will not jeopardize 
future growth by overinvesting in the present. Thus, firm lifecycle theory implies that the 
free cash flows problem will occur in mature firms but not in young corporations. In this 
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sense, one contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the investment performance 
of corporations over the lifecycle of the firm that is supportive of the lifecycle view. 
Furthermore, this paper extends the lifecycle theory of the firm by proposing that to 
neutralize the threat of takeover, managements of maturing firms and their boards of 
directors progressively deploy more consequential antitakeover provisions which allow 
them to overinvest safely and prevent a pronounced decline in the size of their corporations. 
That is, as firms mature and the free cash flow problem becomes more pronounced, 
company managements and their boards of directors put into place progressively more 
antitakeover provisions to accommodate the overinvestments while at the same time 
maintaining a comfortable level of job security.  
An additional contribution of this paper is to develop a new empirical index that, based 
on the financial characteristics of firms over their lifecycle, permits the identification of 
mature corporations with governance problems due to agency costs of free cash flows. As 
discussed below, the derivation of the index gives a clearer perspective on the fact that the 
agency costs of free cash flows are not a one-off problem, but are a recurrent issue once 
firms reach a certain stage in their lifecycle. Importantly, the latter is overlooked in the 
empirical literature as researchers usually employ measures of cash flows retained by 
management in a given fiscal year normalized by book assets (e.g. Chi and Lee, 2010; Lehn 
and Poulsen, 1989) or cash levels at some point in time normalized by book assets or sales 
(Harford et al., 2008; Ditmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). 
Contrary to the empirical index constructed in this paper, such measures imply that the free 
cash flow problem can be present in a firm in a given year and disappear in the next rather 
than being a recurrent problem and a feature of the lifecycle of the firm. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses firm lifecycle theory 
and the progressive deterioration of corporate governance over the lifecycle of the firm as 
evidenced by an increase in overinvestment and managerial entrenchment. Section 3 
discusses the theory behind the empirical index proposed in this paper to separate young 
from mature companies. Section 4 discusses the econometric specifications to test the 
theory. Section 5, describes the data and presents the econometric results. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. THE LIFECYCLE OF THE FIRM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Figure 1 illustrates some of the key aspects of the lifecycle theory of the firm developed 
by Mueller (2003). The situation faced by young firms is shown on the left hand side of the 
figure. According to the theory, young firms are characterized by rapid growth and by the 
fact that the amounts needed to fund their positive net present value investment 
opportunities will generally exceed its internal cash flows (I
*
 > CF). Hence, for young 
firms the shareholder-wealth-maximization policy is to procure outside capital and invest 
until the firm’s marginal cost of capital equals the firm’s marginal return on investment and 
pay no dividends. In this situation, shareholders will clearly be in favor of providing the 
means to the young firm to increase the level of investments until all positive net present 
value projects have been undertaken. Conversely, growth maximizing managements of 
young firms would not invest in negative net present value projects since future profit 
would be reduced and the effect would be to increase present growth at the expense of the 
future growth of the firm. Thus, for a young firm, managerial and stockholder interests 
regarding investment policy and growth coincide. This is also represented on the left hand 
side of Figure 1 where the growth of young firms is depicted by a solid line. As can be 
5 
 
seen, for young firms growth takes place at a rate which is consistent with shareholder 
wealth maximization.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
On the other hand, the right hand side of Figure 1 illustrates the case of mature firms. 
According to lifecycle theory, as firms become older their cash flows increase enormously 
while their investment opportunities decline as their industry matures. As a consequence, 
for older firms the positive net present value investment opportunities eventually become 
smaller that its internal cash flows (I
* 
< CF). Now, for mature firms the shareholder-
wealth-maximizing policy would also be to continue investing until the marginal rate of 
return of the firm is equal to its marginal cost of capital. However, this would involve the 
reduction in the size of the firm as shown by the solid line in the figure. In order to prevent 
a reduction in the size of the firm, firm lifecycle theory predicts that growth-maximizing 
managements will tend to reduce, but not totally suppress, dividend payouts as these 
payments diminish the quantity of resources available for growth. Instead, managements 
will invest the funds in negative net present value projects. Consequently, it is at this point 
in the lifecycle of the firm that the key agency problem of free cash flows takes place. This 
is depicted in Figure 1 by a dashed line representing the fact that the growth of mature 
firms will be higher than that of a hypothetical mature shareholder-wealth-maximizing 
firm. 
Nevertheless, the lifecycle theory of the firm also points out that there exist mechanisms 
that prevent managers from overinvesting too much in negative net present value projects. 
The most important of these mechanisms is the threat of a takeover. If shareholder 
6 
 
dissatisfaction with management is too great the stock price may plunge, and this may 
increase the likelihood of a takeover. Now, it is clear that in the context of U.S. institutions 
the managements of maturing firms and their boards of directors can neutralize the takeover 
threat to a certain extent by progressively deploying antitakeover provisions. Thus, in this 
paper we extend the lifecycle theory of the firm by suggesting that as firms mature and the 
free cash flow problem becomes more pronounced, company managements and their 
boards of directors put into place progressively more antitakeover provisions to 
accommodate the overinvestments while at the same time maintaining a comfortable level 
of job security. The implication is that as firms mature corporate governance will tend to 
deteriorate as reflected in managerial entrenchment and overinvestment in negative net 
present value projects. 
In addition it is important to note that, as shown in Figure 1, despite the fact that mature 
firms tend to over-invest their rate of growth is much lower than that of firms in their early 
years. This is a consequence of reduced opportunities for internal investment in mature 
industries as mentioned above. Therefore, according to firm lifecycle theory it is not the 
fastest-growing firms that tend to over-invest for these are typically young firms with good 
investment opportunities. Instead, over-investment problems are likely to occur in mature 
firms, especially those with entrenched managements. Faced with the prospect of 
contracting hierarchies, reduced real salaries, lower opportunities for promotion, and even 
unemployment many managers will very likely look for ways to make their companies 
grow. The upshot is that a mature-growth-maximizing firm will undertake more investment 
and pay a lower dividend than a stockholder-wealth-maximizing firm with the objective of 
preventing retrenchment. 
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Thus, it is readily apparent that the lifecycle theory of the firm provides a wealth of 
predictions for some of the key issues in the field of corporate finance and corporate 
governance that range from agency conflicts to funding and dividend policy. In this paper 
we will concentrate on the following testable propositions: (a) the agency costs of free cash 
flows are a recurrent problem for mature firms but not a characteristic problem of young 
firms, (b) as firms mature progressively more antitakeover provisions are put into place to 
accommodate overinvestment, hence (c) corporate governance deteriorates as firms mature. 
3. AN EMPIRICAL INDEX TO SEPARATE YOUNG FROM MATURE FIRMS 
We have seen that according to firm lifecycle theory the cash flows of young firms are 
usually too small when compared to the amounts required for investment at the optimal 
level. Therefore, young firms can be characterized as being dependent on their outside 
sources of finance to fully exploit their investment opportunities. In contrast, the cash flows 
of mature firms are generally larger than the amounts of cash required for investment at the 
optimal level. Thus, mature firms can be considered to be financially autonomous in the 
sense that they can fund all their investments and at the same time return part of that cash to 
investors in the form of dividends or stock repurchases.  
However, it is also important to take into account that debt financing is not subject to 
the free cash flow problem. Clearly, if the firm fails to pay interest or capital it becomes 
bankrupt and can be liquidated. It is only the equity-holders that suffer losses from a policy 
of growth maximization through overinvestment. Hence, the key issue regarding the agency 
costs of free cash flows is to determine when a firm is financially dependent on 
shareholders and when is financially autonomous from its shareholders.  
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Accordingly, let us define firms that are financially dependent on shareholders as those 
that on most occasions have cash flows that are smaller than their investments funded with 
equity and retained cash flows, and consequently have to issue new shares in order to 
undertake the investments. Conversely, let us define firms that are financially autonomous 
from shareholders as those that on most occasions have internal cash flows which are 
greater than their levels of investments funded with equity and retained cash flows. It is in 
these financially autonomous firms where the agency costs of free cash flow can occur. 
From the foregoing considerations, an autonomy index or “A-index” can be constructed 
as follows: over a number of past years immediately preceding the year in question, add up 
the number of times a given company has cash flows which are greater than its investments 
funded using new equity plus retained cash flows (CF > ΔE + CF - Dividends). Clearly, 
financially dependent young firms will tend to issue a substantial amount of new equity and 
pay no dividends so that their CF will usually be smaller than their level of investments 
using new equity and retained cash flows. On the other hand, financially autonomous 
mature firms will issue very little new equity and will pay dividends, so that their CF will 
be usually greater than their level of investments using new equity and retained cash flows. 
Thus, firms that are financially autonomous from their shareholders will obtain a higher 
score in this index relative to those that are financially dependent on their shareholders.  
Now, how long a period should we consider in order to construct the A-index? Graham 
(2006, p. 319) suggests that in analyzing firm financial statements one should use a fairly 
long period in the past: 7 to 10 years “in order to iron out the frequent ups and downs of the 
business cycle”… and to get “a better idea of the company’s earning power.” Hence, the A-
index for a given company in a given year will be constructed by adding one point for each 
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year in which a company has greater cash flows than investments funded with equity plus 
retained cash flows over the previous 7 years.  Accordingly, the A-index will range from 0 
to 7. 
Importantly, the A-index is designed to avoid a problem present in empirical studies 
that measure firm age in years. Specifically, the difficulty is that some firms mature faster 
than average e.g. those producing intermediate goods like transistors, while others mature 
much more slowly e.g. those manufacturing consumer products like Coca Cola (Mueller 
and Yun, 1998). Hence, if one measures firm age in years there is a danger that some young 
firms will be classified as mature when their economic characteristics indicate they are still 
young, or vice-versa, mature firms could be classified as young when in fact they present 
all the characteristics of a mature company. This problem is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
As can be seen, the A-index represents a better empirical index for the purpose of 
separating young firms from mature companies than firm age. While measuring firm age in 
years can lead to an erroneous classification as some firms mature faster than others, the A-
index will classify young firms as financially dependent as long as they retain their strong 
growth. On the other hand, the A-index will classify mature firms as financially 
autonomous due to their slow growth (or even negative growth).  
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4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
4.1. The “marginal q” method  
To test the propositions stated above, in this paper we will employ a procedure first 
proposed by Mueller and Reardon (1993) (henceforth M&R) to measure deviations from 
shareholder wealth maximization as a consequence of overinvestment. In stating their 
method, M&R start by defining It as the investment of a firm in period t, CFt+j as the cash 
flow that the investment generates in t+j, and it as the firm’s discount rate in t. Thus, the 
present value of the investment, PVt can be expressed as follows: 

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
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PV                                                     (1)  
Then, M&R take the PVt from Eq. (1) and the investment It, and calculate the ratio of 
“the pseudo permanent return rt to it,” a ratio usually labelled qmt or “marginal q.” 
 tmt
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PV                                                      (2) 
That is, M&R argue that if the company had invested It in a project that generated a 
permanent return rt, this project would have produced the same PVt as in Eq. (1). The ‘qmt’ 
ratio is the key statistic in M&R’s analysis; it can measure overinvestment problems of the 
type where free cash flows are retained and invested in negative net present value projects. 
Then, M&R define the market value of the firm Mt as 
                                        (3) tttttt
MPVMM    11
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Where, δt is defined as the depreciation rate that the capital market appraises for the 
firm’s total capital, and μt is the error of the market in evaluating the market value of the 
firm. M&R then subtract Mt-1 from both sides of Eq. (3), replace PVt with qmt It, and finally 
divide both sides by Mt-1 and obtain: 
111
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M&R then argue that Eq. (4) can be used to estimate δt and qmt. To estimate Eq. (4) 
M&R utilize data on the market value of each firm and its investments. They define Mt as 
the sum of the market value outstanding shares of a company plus the market value of its 
outstanding debt. And they define investment as:  
ADVDREDDividendsCFI  &                                          (5) 
Where CF are the cash flows of the firm defined as the sum of income before 
extraordinary items and depreciation, and ΔD and ΔE are defined as net additions to 
investment funds from changes in outstanding debt and equity respectively. Moreover, 
M&R argue that although R&D and advertising expenditures ADV are charged to expenses 
(as opposed to be treated as investments in the company accounts) they are also forms of 
investment that can produce intangible capital which contributes to a firm’s market value, 
and that for this reason they add them to their measure of total investment.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Figure 3 exemplifies the M&R equation (Eq. (4)) and its usefulness for measuring 
overinvestment. A marginal q which is smaller than one indicates that managements are 
investing below the firm’s cost of capital. In such a case shareholders would clearly prefer 
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to receive the cash in the form of dividends or stock repurchases rather than seeing it 
reinvested. If managements are able to repeatedly invest below the firm’s cost of capital, 
this would evidence the investor’s inability to force the managements to pay out the free 
cash flows. 
4.2. Specification of the investment performance equation 
Since the objective of the present econometric investigation is to determine whether 
overinvestment occurs as the firm matures, the following specification for marginal q will 
be estimated: 
tititititimt firmagedelawarefirmsizeEindexAindexq ,5,41,3,2,10          (6) 
 Where, A-index is the index of firm financial autonomy developed above and E-index is 
an index of managerial entrenchment developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). In this paper we 
will employ Bebchuk et al.’s index since it is constructed using a more reasoned approach 
than other indices available in the literature. Instead of including every single anti-takeover 
provision in their index, Bebchuck et al. base the inclusion of each provision on discussions 
with lawyers, their own personal analysis and the examination of provisions that attract 
opposition from institutional investors. In this way, Bebchuk et al. identify six key 
governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to amend by-laws, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for 
charter amendments. The E-index is created for a given firm in a given year by assigning a 
point for each of the six key provisions that the firm has. Thus, the E-index ranges from 0 to 
6. These two indices will be our key corporate governance determinants of marginal q. As 
can be seen, the coefficients have been entered in Eq. (6) with their expected a priori signs 
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according to theory and previous research. The equation states that marginal q declines as 
firm financial autonomy and managerial entrenchment increase. This is because lifecycle 
theory predicts that as firms become more financially autonomous and more antitakeover 
provisions are put in place overinvestment will tend to occur and this will be reflected in a 
low marginal q.  
Moreover, to control for other potential determinants of qmt, additional variables are 
included in Eq. (6). The first of the control variables, firmsize, will be measured as the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets at the end of year t-1. This variable is 
expected to have a negative sign. This is because traditionally (i.e. before the mid-1980s in 
the U.S.) large firm size used to be considered enough to allow managements to 
substantially over-invest and yet feel secure to a large extent. However, from the point of 
view of managements, following the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s large firm size 
probably has not been considered sufficient to provide security, and therefore it is likely 
that this variable may be insignificant for samples taken from more recent periods. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that this variable may still retain some of its explanatory power 
and for this reason it is included in Eq. (6) as a potential determinant of marginal q.  
Secondly, a control variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is incorporated in 
delaware and zero otherwise is included in Eq. (6). It is expected on a priori grounds that 
this variable will have a positive sign. The reason is that prior work, such as that by Daines 
(2001), suggests that the institutional environment for firms incorporated in the state of 
Delaware may be more effective in restraining agency problems, in which case marginal q 
should be higher.  
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Finally, following prior work on rates of return on investment over the lifecycle of the 
firm, firm age is included as a control variable in Eq. (6). This variable will be measured as 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since the company’s incorporation. It is 
expected a priori and on the grounds of previous empirical research that the variable will 
have a negative sign (see in particular Mueller and Yun, 1998). However, it is also possible 
that this variable could be insignificant given that different firms have lifecycles of 
different length, and that consequently, the A-index may be a better empirical indicator 
when it comes to the task of distinguishing young firms from mature companies. 
Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (4), including time and industry dummy variables, and 
simplifying the following investment performance regression equation is obtained: 
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Where Timet, t = 1,…, T-1 are time dummy variables, and industryi,j,  j =1,…, J-1 are 
industry dummy variables, while α is the intercept for the base or benchmark category.  
Petersen (2009) has recently examined the empirical literature and provides guidance on 
the appropriate methods to follow when using corporate finance panel data sets.  Following 
his work, Eq. (7) includes time dummy variables to deal with time effects. In addition 
standard errors clustered by firm will be used in the next section to address firm effects. 
Finally, since depreciation rates should vary across companies depending on the type of 
investments in capital assets they undertake, Eq. (7) includes industry dummy variables by 
assigning each company to a two digit SIC industry code (Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2000).  
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5. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
5.1. Sample selection 
The starting point our data collection is Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) E-index database. 
Currently, the database contains information for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004 and 2006. To obtain a sample of firms with reasonably long time series of data 
with which to build the variables, the database was initially inspected for companies with 
non-missing values for the years 1990 and 2004.2 In this manner 586 companies were 
identified. Given that some of the companies changed names and ticker symbols, the 
information was matched using 8 digit CUSIPs in order to make sure that the data referred 
to the same company.3 Then, a search for these 586 firms was performed using Datastream 
and 556 firms were found. Next, banks, financial companies and certain service industries 
(SICs 6000 to 6999 and above 8100) were excluded because the nature of capital and 
investment in these industries is fundamentally different when compared to non-financial 
firms. This reduced the sample by 81 companies from 556 to 475. For this final group of 
475 firms the usual practice of researchers who utilize corporate governance provision 
indices (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009) was followed and the observations 
for the years in which IRRC does not publish governance provisions data were filled in by 
assuming that the provisions remain unchanged in the period between IRRC publications. 
Given the information contained in Bebchuk’s database at the time of the data collection for 
this paper it was possible to assign values for the 475 firm’s E-indices for a period of 19 
                                                          
2
 Bebchuk et al.’s database contains two sub-samples, a no dual class stock sub-sample and a dual class stock 
sub-sample. Following prior research we exclude dual class stocks for the reason that in those companies “the 
superior voting rights may be sufficient to provide incumbents with a powerful entrenchment mechanism that 
renders the other entrenchment provisions relatively unimportant” (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
3
 CUSIP is an acronym that refers to the 8 character alphanumeric security identifier distributed by the 
Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures. 
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years, comprising the years from 1990 to 2008. Market prices and accounting data for these 
companies were obtained from the Datastream database as described in the Appendix. 
5.2. Sample description and test of hypotheses for differences between means 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the empirical variables employed in this paper. 
As can be seen the firms in the sample contain substantial variation in their age, size, 
financial autonomy, entrenchment and other variables important for testing our hypotheses 
in the context of firm lifecycle theory.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
To further describe the sample used in this paper Table 2 below presents the values of the 
A-index and E-index variables sorted by firm age. Moreover, for each variable the table 
presents tests hypotheses for differences between the means of the youngest firms (0 to 15 
years of age and 16 to 30 years age) and the means of older firms in the other time buckets. 
This is interesting because it helps elucidate whether mature firms earn more free cash 
flows than younger companies and if the managements of older firms are more entrenched. 
The information in the table suggests that both propositions are correct. As can be seen, 
older firms have higher A-indices on average than younger companies and the tests of 
differences between means indicate that the differences are significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, the table indicates that the E-index tends to increase with firm age and that the 
differences between the means of the variable for young and mature firms are also 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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From these results we can conclude that while younger firms depend on outside 
shareholders to finance investments, older firms earn free cash flows on a continuing basis 
which makes them largely independent from shareholders. In addition, compared to young 
firms older firms have more consequential antitakeover provisions put in place as measured 
by the E-index. Both results taken together suggest that mature firms use the free cash flows 
that they earn on a ongoing basis to overinvest while, on the other hand, young companies 
will not overinvest even if they earn free cash flows on a given year since their 
managements know they will have to come back to the shareholders for additional funding 
in the future.  
Finally, correlations between the empirical variables are presented in Table 3. It is 
interesting to note that the E-index presents positive and significant correlations with the A-
index and logfirmage. This implies that as firms mature, and on average become more 
financially autonomous, their managements tend to deploy a larger number of 
consequential anti-takeover provisions. On the other hand, Table 3 shows that the A-index 
presents significantly negative correlations with (Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1 and It/Mt-1. This suggests 
that, consistent with firm lifecycle arguments, companies with a low A-index (young firms) 
invest relatively more, and have a higher rate of increase in their market values when 
compared to firms with a higher A-index (older companies). The latter is reinforced by the 
fact that that logfirmage also has negative and significant correlations with (Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1 
and It/Mt-1.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Moreover, the table shows that the A-index has a positive and significant correlation 
with logtotalassets and logfirmage. This implies that, consistent with firm lifecycle theory, 
companies with a high A-index are on average relatively larger and older. Finally, note the 
negative and statistically significant correlation between delaware and logfirmage. This 
suggests that the positive relationship between incorporation in Delaware and good firm 
performance reported by Daines (2001) may reflect that firms incorporated in Delaware are 
younger on average than firms incorporated elsewhere and not any corporate governance 
advantage of incorporating in that State. 
Having elucidated that database contains firms with sufficient variation in their age, 
sizes and other variables for the purposes of testing the paper’s hypotheses, the next 
subsection employs the econometric methods discussed above to test for overinvestment. 
5.3. Econometric results 
 Table 4 below presents the results from estimating Eq. (7). Mueller and Yun’s (1998) 
investigation regarding investment performance over the lifecycle of the firm is replicated 
in Table 4 column 1. This column shows results obtained by (a) specifying marginal q as 
equal to an intercept plus a coefficient times the natural logarithm of firm age, (b) 
substituting for marginal q in the basic M&R investment performance regression equation 
(Eq. 4) and finally (c) estimating the parameters by OLS. Similar to Mueller and Yun’s 
findings, the results in the table show a significantly positive intercept of 1.8002 and 
negative and significant coefficient for logfirmage of -0.1810. These estimates for our 
sample, pertaining to the time period 1990-2008, imply that for the average firm marginal q 
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falls below 1 (indicative of overinvestment) around 80 years after its incorporation (qmt  = 
1.8 - 0.18 (ln(80)) = 1). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
However, as discussed above, a specification in which firm age is measured in years 
since firm incorporation, has some important drawbacks. The most important is that, 
logically, different firms will have lifecycles of different lengths when measured in years. 
This is the reason why the A-index was constructed. Moreover, while the presence of free 
cash flows is a necessary condition for overinvestment, it is not sufficient. The reason is 
that if management overinvests the market value of the firm may plunge and a hostile 
takeover may ensue (Mueller, 2003). This is why it is important to include an index of 
antitakeover provisions such as the E-index to determine how insulated firm management is 
from the takeover threat. Thus, Table 4 column 2 specifies marginal q as equal to an 
intercept plus a coefficient times the A-index plus another coefficient times the E-index. 
This specification is then substituted in M&R investment performance regression equation 
(Eq. 4) and finally the parameters are estimated by OLS. As shown in Table 4 column 2, 
there are significantly negative coefficients for both the A-index and the E-index at the 1 
percent level. Importantly, this result is consistent with the predictions of firm lifecycle 
theory as it signifies that marginal q will tend to decrease as both the A-index and the E-
index increase. 
Next, Table 4 column 3 presents the results of running a regression equation which 
includes the preceding two kinds of measures (i.e. years since firm incorporation and firm 
characteristics as captured by the A-index and E-index) as a means to detect overinvestment 
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problems. As can be seen, while both the A-index and the E-index coefficients remain 
negative and significant at the 1% level, the coefficient for the natural logarithm of firm age 
becomes insignificant at any conventional level. The reason for this result is that, as 
mentioned earlier, although it is logically to expect that firms will go through a lifecycle 
there is no reason to expect that the lengths of company lifecycles measured in years will be 
similar for the diversity of firms. Different companies produce different types of products 
and operate under different business conditions. For this reason this paper argues that is 
more effective to measure firm characteristics such as financial autonomy and managerial 
entrenchment directly as a means to assess firm age, than to try to determine if a firm is 
young or mature by using firm age measured in years. 
Further, Table 4 column 4 presents the results of running a regression equation with 
additional control variables. Specifically, column 4 presents the results of estimating Eq. 
(7) where specific predictions for its coefficients are formulated. As can be seen, in this 
specification both the A-index and the E-index coefficients are negative as predicted and are 
significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient for logfirmage although negative as 
expected on a priori grounds is insignificant at any conventional level. Interestingly, the 
coefficient for logtotalassetst-1 is negative as predicted, and it is significant at the 5% level 
(one tailed t-test). This provides evidence in favor of the proposition that large firm size 
gives managements protection from the takeover threat, and that consequently, the 
managements of larger firms have more leeway to overinvest than those of smaller 
companies. On the other hand, contrary to our expectations the coefficient for delaware is 
negative and insignificant at any conventional level. Thus, at least for our sample we find 
no evidence that the institutional environment for firms incorporated in the State of 
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Delaware may be more effective in preventing agency problems as manifested by 
overinvestment. 
Finally, Table 4 column 5 presents the results of running a more parsimonious 
regression equation in which marginal q is specified as equal to an intercept plus a 
coefficient times the A-index, plus another coefficient times the E-index, and finally an 
additional coefficient times logtotalassetst-1. As shown in the table, for this specification the 
intercept is significantly positive at the 1% level and the coefficients for the A-index, E-
index and logtotalassetst-1 are significantly negative at the 1% level. 
The investment performance results are further illustrated with the aid of Table 5. This 
table presents values for marginal q implied by the estimates in Table 4 column 5 for 
different combinations of the A-index and the E-index (similar results are obtained if the 
estimates in Table 4 column 4 are used instead). Note that in the calculations 
logtotalassetst-1 is held at its mean value of 21.6287. Hence, for example, the estimates 
imply that the value of marginal q for the average firm when the A-index = 1 and the E-
index = 1 equals 1.4302 (qmt= 2.4793 -0.069(1) –0.063(1) –0.0424 (21.6287) = 1.4302). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results in Table 5 show that the values of marginal q for the average firm are 
substantially higher than 1 when firm financial autonomy as measured by the A-index is 
low and managerial entrenchment as measured by the E-index is also low. Specially, the 
table shows the highest value of marginal q of 1.5622 when the A-index and the E-index are 
both equal to zero. More generally, the table shows that the values of marginal q decline 
progressively as financial autonomy and entrenchment become more important. 
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The results in Table 5 can be best interpreted with the aid of Figure 4. Marginal q equals 
the area under the marginal rate of return schedule (mrr) between 0 and the level of 
investments divided by the area under the cost of capital (i) between 0 and the level of 
investments (Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2000). Thus, an estimated marginal q that is greater 
than one is consistent with the interpretation that firms are maximizing shareholder value 
by equalizing their marginal rates of returns to their marginal cost of capital. For example, 
as shown in Figure 4, if a firm invested I1 it would equalize its marginal rate of return mrr 
to its marginal cost of capital i, and its marginal q would equal the area under mrr from 0 to 
I1, that is ‘a + b,’ divided by the area under the marginal cost of capital curve, namely ‘b’, 
which is clearly greater than one.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Therefore, since the data indicates that marginal qs are substantially greater than one for 
low values of the A-index and the E-index, we conclude that there is significant evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that the managements of financially dependent firms as measured 
by the A-index who are not entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the 
E-index (i.e. young firms) will tend to invest in a manner which is consistent with 
shareholder wealth maximization as measured by marginal q.  
In addition, the results in Table 5 show that the values of marginal q for the average firm 
are close to 1 when firm financial autonomy as measured by the A-index is high and 
managerial entrenchment as measured by the E-index is low. For instance, the table shows a 
value of marginal q of 1.0162 when the A-index is equal to 7 and the E-index is equal to 1. 
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In general, the table shows values for marginal q which are close to 1 in the upper-right 
hand region of Table 5. 
Now, an estimated qmt which is close to 1 can be interpreted as an indication of 
“moderate” overinvestment taking place. To see this suppose that a firm invests I2 as shown 
in Figure 4, and moreover assume that the areas labelled ‘a’ and ‘d’ in the figure are 
approximately equal. In this case, marginal q would equal the area under mrr, that is ‘a + b 
+ c’, divided by the area under the cost of capital curve, i.e. ‘b + c + d’. Given that ‘a’ and 
‘e’ have approximately equal areas, marginal q approximately equals 1 and, as the figure 
shows, there is overinvestment taking place as the marginal investment project has a rate of 
return that is below its cost of capital.  
Therefore, the estimates of marginal q presented in Table 5 are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the managements of financially autonomous firms as measured by the A-
index who are not entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E-index 
will tend to over-invest moderately as measured by marginal q. Note that overinvestment is 
“moderate” for the case of these mature firms because of the threat of takeover.  
Furthermore, the results shown in Table 5 indicate that there is strong evidence of 
overinvestment as measured by marginal q when both the A-index and the E-index have 
high values. From the previous discussion it is clear that no firm that maximizes 
shareholder wealth would undertake investment for which qmt < 1, for this unequivocally 
implies overinvestment. Now, when the A-index = 7 and the E-index = 6 the marginal q 
implied by the estimates of Table 4 column 5 equals 0.7012. This suggests that on average 
for every dollar that firms with these high levels of financial autonomy and entrenchment 
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invested during the period 1990-2008, the market value of these firms increased by only 
about $0.70. Consequently, the estimates of marginal q presented in Table 5 are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the managements of mature financially autonomous firms as 
measured by the A-index who are also entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as 
measured by the E-index will tend to over-invest substantially as measured by marginal q.  
Finally, the results in Table 5 show that the values of marginal q for the average firm are 
substantially greater than 1 when firm financial autonomy as measured by the A-index is 
low and managerial entrenchment as measured by the E-index is high. For instance, the 
table shows a value of marginal q of 1.2472 when the A-index is equal to 0 and the E-index 
is equal to 5. This suggests that on average for every dollar that firms with these levels of 
low financial autonomy and high entrenchment invested during the period 1990-2008, the 
market value of these firms increased by about $1.25. In general, the table shows values for 
marginal q which are greater than 1 in the lower-left hand side region of Table 5. Hence, 
the estimates of marginal q presented in Table 5 are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
managements of financially dependent firms as measured by the A-index who are also 
entrenched using anti-takeover provisions as measured by the E-index will tend to invest in 
a manner consistent with shareholder wealth maximization as measured by marginal q. In 
other words, if there are no free cash flows there can be no overinvestment even though the 
management of the firm is entrenched. However, this does not rule out that there may be 
other agency problems involved that cause the managements of these firms to keep 
antitakeover provisions in place.
4
  
                                                          
4
 I discuss and examine this issue empirically elsewhere. I conclude that these companies are mature firms 
that have lost their financial autonomy but that would not remove their antitakeover provisions due to their 
prior investments in unrelated businesses which makes them potential hostile takeover targets (Saravia, 2010). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The agency costs of free cash flows are a problem which is characteristic of mature 
firms. As firms mature their cash flows eventually become larger than the amounts needed 
to fund all positive net present value projects. If it is taken into consideration that some 
mature firms need to retrench, it is not surprising that their managements will employ some 
of the free cash flows to mitigate the negative growth. Faced with the option between over-
investing and firing workers, they will likely choose the more popular route. The lifecycle 
theory of the firm and the derivation of the A-index give a clearer perspective on this fact.  
The A-index contrasts with current measurements of free cash flows in that it makes it 
clear that the agency costs of free cash flows are a recurrent problem for mature firms and a 
feature of the lifecycle of the firm. The A-index compares the size of the cash flows with 
the actual investments undertaken using equity and retained earnings rather than solely 
measuring the size of the retained cash flows or the level of cash held by a corporation at 
some point in time. In this sense, the contribution of this paper has been to develop a new 
empirical index that allows us to separate young from mature firms more effectively than 
using chronological firm age. 
Finally, firm lifecycle theory and the results in this paper leads us to conclude that, 
assuming that the objective of a policy maker is to improve corporate governance in the 
sense that managers remain responsive to the wishes of the shareholders, there is only one 
effective policy to be implemented: to outlaw the deployment of anti-takeover provisions. 
If this policy were implemented over-investment on the part of mature corporations would 
be mitigated to a moderate level. The reason is that if shareholder dissatisfaction with 
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management were to become too great the stock price would plunge, and this would 
increase the likelihood of a takeover. Thus, management would be under increasing 
pressure to pay out the funds to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock repurchases 
rather than over-investing.  
APPENDIX 
Table A.1 lists the sources of data used in this paper. The first column of the table 
displays the data items used, while the second column presents the data sources. Panel A 
presents the data needed to compute the market value of a firm at the end of year t (Mt), 
which in turn is required to implement the Mueller and Reardon (1993) marginal q method. 
Specifically, the table shows that Mt is computed by adding the market value of common 
stock (wc05301 x P) plus the book value of total debt (wc03255) and preferred stock 
(wc03451).
5
  Where the market value common stock is calculated by multiplying the end of 
fiscal year number of shares (wc05301) times the end of fiscal year price per share (P).   
[Insert Table A.1 here] 
On the other hand, Panel B lists the data needed to calculate the investment of a firm 
over year t (It) which is also necessary to implement the M&R marginal q method. In 
particular, It is calculated by first subtracting dividends (wc04551) from cash flows 
(wc04201) and then adding net new equity (the change in the number of shares wc05301 
times average share price P over year t), net new debt (the change in total debt wc03255 
over year t), R&D expenditures (wc01201), and advertising expenses (estimated by 
multiplying total sales (wc01001) and advertising to sales ratios taken from IRS reports on 
                                                          
5
 Datastream datatypes are presented in parenthesis. 
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corporation returns, see Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2000). Moreover, Panel C lists the sources 
of data for Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) E-index, the companies’ dates of incorporation which is 
used to compute firm age, as well as the book value of total assets.  
The financial data utilized to compute the autonomy index are also taken from Table 
A.1. As discussed previously, the A-index is calculated by adding one point for each year in 
which a company has greater cash flows than investments financed using equity and 
retained cash flows during the previous 7 years. Investments in financed using equity and 
retained cash flows (Ie) are measured as follows: 
                                     EDividendsCFI e                                                          (A.1) 
Where CF is the cash flow of the firm (wc04201), Dividends are taken from Datastream 
(wc04551) and ΔE stands for net new equity. Therefore, when calculating the A-index for a 
given firm in year t, 1 point is added for every year (from t-7 to t-1) in which CF > Ie. 
Finally note that prior to the calculation of the M&R variables all items were deflated by 
using the CPI (2000 = 1). The CPI data for the U.S. were obtained from the World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, ESDS International, University of Manchester. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
This table provides summary statistics for the variables employed in this paper. A-index is a firm-level 
index of financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in 
which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment financed using equity and retained cash 
flows. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2009). (Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1 is the 
percentage change in the market value of the firm between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t. 
It/Mt-1 is the investment undertaken by a given firm during year t divided by the market value of the 
firm at the end of year t-1. logtotalassets is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
measured at the end of year t-1 in US$. delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm 
is incorporated in Delaware and zero otherwise. logfirmage is the natural logarithm of firm age 
measured in years since the company’s incorporation.  
 Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
A-index 8687 5.0199 6 2.1651 0 7 
E-index 8687 2.6594 3 1.3638 0 6 
(Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1 8620 0.0807 0.0309 0.3454 -0.8363 4.5065 
It/Mt-1 8639 0.1262 0.0942 0.1607 -0.7120 2.2021 
logtotalassetst-1 8686 21.6287 21.5468 1.4726 17.2768 27.2513 
delaware 8687 0.4649 0 0.4988 0 1 
logfirmage 8687 4.0373 4.2195 0.6085 0.0000 5.0752 
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Table 2. Financial autonomy and managerial entrenchment over the lifecycle of the firm  
This table presents the means and standard deviations of the A-index and E-index variables sorted by firm age. The A-index is a 
firm-level index of financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given 
firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment financed using new equity and retained cash flows. The E-index is the 
entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Firm age is the company’s age measured in years since its incorporation. In 
addition, for the A-index and E-index variables, the table tests hypotheses for differences between the means of the youngest firms 
(0 to 15 years as well as 16 to 30 years of age) and the means of older firms in the other time buckets. * and ** indicate that the 
difference is significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively (one tailed t-tests). 
  
Firm age 
 
A-index 
 
E-index 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Diff. 0-15yrs Diff. 16-30yrs   N Mean Std. Dev. Diff. 0-15yrs Diff. 16-30yrs 
 
 
     
 
     
0 to 15 years 
 
358 2.5419 2.3933 
  
 
358 2.0196 1.4151 
  
16 to 30 years 
 
997 3.5757 2.3800 -1.0338* 
 
 
997 2.3019 1.3942 -0.2823* 
 
31 to 45 years 
 
1235 4.4121 2.3583 -1.8702* -0.8364* 
 
1235 2.5870 1.3933 -0.5674* -0.2851* 
46 to 60 years 
 
1114 4.7271 2.1890 -2.1852* -1.1514* 
 
1114 2.7136 1.3682 -0.694* -0.4117* 
61 to 75 years 
 
1471 5.4317 1.9390 -2.8898* -1.856* 
 
1471 2.6139 1.3574 -0.5943* -0.312* 
76 to 90 years 
 
1560 5.9314 1.4570 -3.3895* -2.3557* 
 
1560 2.7423 1.3393 -0.7227* -0.4404* 
91 to 105 years 
 
1198 5.7362 1.5470 -3.1943* -2.1605* 
 
1198 2.9332 1.2421 -0.9136* -0.6313* 
106 to 120 years 
 
445 5.7371 1.5218 -3.1952* -2.1614* 
 
445 3.0090 1.3237 -0.9894* -0.7071* 
121 to 135 years 
 
154 5.4545 1.9607 -2.9126* -1.8788* 
 
154 2.9935 1.1289 -0.9739* -0.6916* 
136 to 150 years 
 
122 5.9508 0.9435 -3.4089* -2.3751* 
 
122 2.7377 1.2779 -0.7181* -0.4358* 
151 to 165 years 
 
33 5.5758 1.1997 -3.0339* -2.0001* 
 
33 2.8788 1.139 -0.8592* -0.5769* 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the variables employed in this paper. A-index is a firm-level 
index of financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a 
given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment financed using equity and retained earnings. E-index is 
the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2009). (Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1 is the percentage change in the market 
value of the firm between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t. It/Mt-1 is the investment undertaken by a 
given firm during year t divided by the market value of the firm at the end of year t-1. logtotalassets is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets measured at the end of year t-1 in US$. delaware is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is incorporated in Delaware and zero otherwise. 
logfirmage is the natural logarithm of firm age measured in years since the company’s incorporation. * and ** 
indicate that a correlation is significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
  
Variable A-index E-index (Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1 It/Mt-1 logtotal-
assetst-1 
delaware logfirmage 
        
A-index 1.0000       
E-index 0.0503* 1.0000      
(Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1 -0.1224* -0.0698* 1.0000        
It/Mt-1 -0.1419* 0.0095  0.5219* 1.0000    
logtotalassetst-1 0.1014* -0.0790* -0.0844* -0.0945* 1.0000   
delaware -0.1363* -0.1307* 0.0419* 0.0774* 0.0340* 1.0000  
logfirmage 0.4158* 0.1533* -0.1231* -0.1145* 0.2344* -0.2388* 1.0000 
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Table 4. Investment performance over the lifecycle of the firm 
This table presents estimates of ‘marginal q’ for firms in the paper’s database over the time period from 
1990 to 2008. The technique employed was originally developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). The 
estimation method is OLS. The dependent variable is (Mt-Mt-1)/Mt-1, which is the percentage change in 
the market value of the firm between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t. It/Mt-1 is the investment 
undertaken by a given firm during year t divided by the market value of the firm at the end of year t-1. 
A-index is a firm-level index of financial autonomy computed by adding one point for every year, in 
the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment financed using 
equity and retained cash flows. E-index is the entrenchment index created by Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
logtotalassetst-1 is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets measured at the end of year t-1 
in US$. delaware is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is incorporated in Delaware 
and zero otherwise. logfirmage is the natural logarithm of firm age measured in years since the 
company’s incorporation. The regressions include year dummy variables to pick up movements in 
stock market values which are common to all firms. Moreover, each company is assigned to a two digit 
SIC industry code and industry dummy variables are also included. * and ** indicate that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively (one tailed t-test). Following Petersen 
(2009) standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
        
It/Mt-1 1.8002* 1.5942* 1.7184* 2.5330* 2.4793*  
 (0.2679) (0.1146) (0.2409) (0.4451) (0.4514)  
       
(logfirmaget )It/Mt-1 -0.1810*  -0.0392 -0.0352   
  (0.0640)  (0.0566) (0.0608)   
        
(A-indext )It/Mt-1  -0.0740* -0.0694* -0.0664* -0.0690*  
   (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0149)  
        
(E-indext )It/Mt-1  -0.0616* -0.0586* -0.0636* -0.0630*  
   (0.0202) (0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0211)  
        
(logtotalassetst-1)It/Mt-1    -0.0374** -0.0424*  
     (0.0218) (0.0201)  
       
(delawaret )It/Mt-1    -0.0559   
    (0.0583)   
       
Industry dummy variables? yes yes yes yes yes  
       
Time dummy variables? yes yes yes yes yes  
       
        
Adjusted R
2
 0.3523 0.3616 0.3616 0.3628 0.3626  
Number of observations 8618 8618 8618 8618 8618  
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Table 5. Calculated qmts for different combinations of the A-index and the E-index  
This table presents values for marginal q implied by the estimates in Table 4 column 5 for different 
combinations of the A-index and the E-index. A-index is a firm-level index of financial autonomy 
computed by adding one point for every year, in the previous 7 years, in which a given firm’s cash flows 
are greater than its investment financed using equity and retained earnings. E-index is the entrenchment 
index created by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Note that in the calculations logtotalassetst-1, the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets measured at the end of year t-1 in US$, is held at its mean 
value of 21.6287. 
          
  
A-index 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
E
-i
n
d
ex
 
0 1.5622 1.4932 1.4242 1.3552 1.2862 1.2172 1.1482 1.0792 
1 1.4992 1.4302 1.3612 1.2922 1.2232 1.1542 1.0852 1.0162 
2 1.4362 1.3672 1.2982 1.2292 1.1602 1.0912 1.0222 0.9532 
3 1.3732 1.3042 1.2352 1.1662 1.0972 1.0282 0.9592 0.8902 
4 1.3102 1.2412 1.1722 1.1032 1.0342 0.9652 0.8962 0.8272 
5 1.2472 1.1782 1.1092 1.0402 0.9712 0.9022 0.8332 0.7642 
6 1.1842 1.1152 1.0462 0.9772 0.9082 0.8392 0.7702 0.7012 
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Table A.1. Data sources  
This table lists the main sources of data used in this paper. Panel A shows the data items needed to 
compute the market value of a firm at the end of year t. Panel B lists the data items needed to calculate 
the investment of a firm over year t. Panel C lists the sources of data for important items such as 
Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) E-index, as well as date of incorporation which is used to compute firm age. 
  
Panel A. Firm market value (Mt)  
        Data item Datastream datatype 
  
         Market value of common stock (wc05301 x P) 
                  End of fiscal year number of shares  wc05301 
                  End of fiscal year price per share P 
 
         Book value of total debt wc03255 
         Preferred stock wc03451 
  
 
 
 
Panel B. Investment (It)  
        Data item Datastream datatype/ other 
  
         Cash flow wc04201 
         Dividends wc04551 
         Net new debt = change in total debt during year change in wc03255 
         Net new equity = change in number of common  
         shares outstanding x average share price over year t 
change in wc05301 x average P 
         R&D expenditures  wc01201 
         Advertising expenses  
                   Approximated by multiplying company sales by  
                   advertising to sales ratios from the IRS reports 
                   on corporation returns for 1995. 
IRS reports on corporation 
returns. Table 6: Balance 
sheets, income statements, tax 
and selected other items. See 
Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000).  
         Total sales wc01001  
  
 
 
 
Panel C. Other   
        Data item Datastream datatype/ other 
  
         Total assets  wc02999 
  
         Date of fiscal period end wc05350 
 
         Consumer price index (CPI)    World bank - world 
development indicators 
         Entrenchment index (E-index)   
 
Available from Bebchuk’s 
webpage at  http:// www. 
law.harvard.edu /faculty/ 
bebchuk/data.shtml 
         Date of Incorporation (to compute firm age)   
 
Mergent Industrial Manual 
(Mergent, 2004) 
 
         Industry SIC codes    ‘Eqy Sic Code’ 
(Bloomberg table wizzard) 
         State of incorporation ‘State Of Incorporation’ 
(Bloomberg table wizzard) 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
output of 
the firm 
(e.g. total 
sales) 
Growth- 
maximizing 
firm 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of firm growth over its lifecycle. 
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wealth- 
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of two firms with lifecycles of different length 
 
Source: author’s considerations 
Firm age (in years) 
Firm with 
short 
lifecycle 
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Fig. 3. The M&R model –an example of an overinvestment situation. Source: 
adapted from Mueller and Reardon (1993) 
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Fig. 4. Interpretation of marginal q results.  
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